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25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO.

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY China/USSR

DATE DISTR. 24 Sept. 1951

SUBJECT Sino-Soviet Relations and Possible Chinese
Internal Disunity

NO. OF PAGES 4

25X1A

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

PLACE
ACQUIRED

DATE OF 25X1A

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. 25X1X

DATE OF INFO.

Relations Between the Chinese Communists and the USSR

1. The following three points are the basis for cooperation between the USSR and the Chinese Communists:
 - a. The Soviet foreign policy in the Far East has been mainly the same as the foreign policy of the Chinese Communists, from the standpoint of the Chinese Communists. The most important point is that both the USSR and the Chinese Communists fear that Japan will revive and rearm. The second is that they desire a Communist Korea. The third is that their relations with the various other Far East countries bordering China have as yet shown no point of difference. It is possible that there might be some difference in their relations with the United States and Great Britain, but temporarily they agree on this also. From these points, it is seen that it would not be possible at present for the USSR and the Chinese Communists to have any major difficulties in their relations.
 - b. At present, the Chinese Communists find it hard to feel that the Soviet expansion of power into Chinese soil carries with it any threat of aggression. They are willingly taking such as the "help" from a brotherly nation. This is the only "help" they receive, and they have no reason to give it up.
 - c. From the historical viewpoint, the USSR has taught the Chinese Communists to take advantage of the nationalistic aspirations of the people and the urge for democracy, and has also taught them how to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to attain victory. They are brotherly Communist Parties of the Communist International, and this tie remains strong.

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ARMY	X	AIR	Document No.

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Class. Changed To: TS S

Am. Ent. Soc. 70:2 2001/04/01

Date: 11 AUG 1978 By:

REFERENCE COPY
RDP82-00457 R0007691500

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2. The chief differences that might develop in Sino-Soviet relations are as follows:
 - a. The USSR, already a strong nation, is building an iron curtain, running the race for rearmament, and everywhere trying to stir up war and to vie with the democratic countries led by the United States, with a view to realizing a Communist empire. In the Far East, she follows a radically provocative policy. The Chinese Communists, however, have not become firm in their political control over China; China is not revived, and she is still a poor and backward country, urgently in need of peace and reconstruction. These conditions, as reflected in the minds of the Chinese Communist leaders, call for a fight for existence, for security, and for strength. Now, the warlike policy of the USSR has made the Chinese Communists join the Korean war, and she has been pulled along the path of a third world war. That is the chief inconsistency in the relations between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.
 - b. Soviet help for the Chinese Communists lags far behind the pressing requirements of the Chinese Communists.
 - c. By far the greatest majority of the Chinese people long for peace and reconstruction, and they would not be willing to follow the USSR entirely to be enemies of the United States, Great Britain and other nations, and further, China has traditionally been friendly with the United States. These factors must have had quite some effect among Chinese Communist leaders.
 - d. Since pulling the Chinese Communists into the Korean war, the USSR fears that the Chinese Communists might tend to fall into the psychological state of being conservative and mild. The Soviet advisers would naturally be interfering in various ways, would be doubtful, and would not trust the Chinese Communists. From this, there are bound to be some wrong deductions and childish action on the part of the USSR. Such a state of affairs would bring about displeasure and loss of intimacy.

Possible Causes for Chinese Internal Disunity

3. In April 1949, at a plenary session of the Chinese Communist Central Committee, there were many discussions on Chinese Communist internal disunity. In a final report of the Chinese Communist central authorities, there were put forward the following three problems:
 - a. Production and reconstruction were the crucial problems, and the priority in importance of cities over the villages was stressed as opposed to the view that villages were more important than cities.
 - b. There were two extremes in policy toward the democratic parties or cliques: The close-door policy and that to accommodate.
 - c. The lack of confidence in production and reconstruction, and the dream of American and British economic assistance.
4. From that time on, the Chinese Communists have won military victories; and in the process of economic improvement, it can be said, in general, that the above-stated differences in views have not brought any important development.
5. In November 1950, when the Chinese Communists were about to join the Korean war, Chinese Communist documents emphatically pointed out that there were people opposed to the participation in the Korean war, these people reasoned that China should have closed her doors in order to do reconstruction work, and that the United States would not take the opportunity to invade Manchuria, at least not so early. Some said that CHU Te, LIU Po-cheng and TUNG Pi-wu were against participation in the Korean war, but it has not been verified.
6. Upon taking part in the Korean war, the Chinese Communists had done a series of things to frustrate friendly relations between China and the United States, so as to prove definitely the necessity for joining the war. Though such propaganda produced appreciable results, the large number of casualties sustained by the Chinese Communists at the Korean front, coupled with the increased threats of a great war, have actually intensified people's fear of war, and the internal disquiet of the Chinese Communists.

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to link up her anti-Japanese and anti-American campaigns. At the same time, the Chinese Communists silenced the propaganda to drive the United Nations troops out of Korea and into the sea. This might be an indication that the Chinese Communists have learned a lesson from the Korean war, and that they might be waiting to use the 38th Parallel as the basis for settlement.

8. The Chinese Communists have not slowed down their struggles at home as a result of the Korean war. On the contrary, they have been "stamping out the counter-revolution movements" and vigorously proceeding with land reform and with interflow of goods to keep sound their economy. Everywhere they agitate against tolerance, rightism, and the desire for peace. Such heavy war pressure and the tense atmosphere further increased disquiet among the Communists and especially among the democratic parties or cliques.

Previous History Concerning Sino-Soviet Relations and Chinese Communist Unity

9. In the period of cooperation between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, the Chinese Communists, from MAO Tse-tung down, believed from the bottom of their hearts, that the fundamental policy of cooperation between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists was right. However, at that early stage, the Communist International looked down upon the strength of the Chinese Communists and did not help them to develop fully. After losing many chances to get prepare, it was hastily decided to make the Chinese Communists fight with the Chinese Nationalists for supremacy in China. This was the cause of the failure that they faced.
10. After the split between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, the Chinese Communists leaders believed that their stern opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's Government was the correct fundamental policy. However, the Communist International should be held responsible for guerrilla warfare and the Leftist blind-folded LI Li-san's Line in the time of the Soviets that grew up during the period of armed riots.
11. During the war against Japan, the Communist International had given little interference in the affairs of the Chinese Communists, apart from making political suggestions. We, therefore, could not see any split in the relations between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.
12. In general, there has not been any split between the leaders of the Chinese Communists and those of the USSR. However, from the historical viewpoint, there were differences in the many actual policies. Thus we may say that the Chinese Communist leaders are not without conditions in their admiration of the Soviet leaders.
13. In the past, when the representatives of the Communist International interfered with the internal affairs of the Chinese Communists, the Chinese Communist leaders often ridiculed them for their ignorance of the conditions in China. Pro-Russian elements such as CH'U Ch'u-pai were often ridiculed as "compradores". Mif was usually looked down upon by the Chinese Communists. CHEN Shao-yu and CHANG Wen-tien were singled out as belonging to the Soviet-returned clique.
14. Within the CCP and its armed forces, the cadres fall into various groupings, namely, those of the First, Second, and the Fourth Armies, those of the Long March, and those recruited since the war against Japan. Among the technicians there are those of the Northeast clique and those of the Non-Northeast clique. Northerners are a majority among the local cadres. Besides, there are also returned students from the United States and Europe, and the fighting among the various cliques that took place in the past. These are the potential factors of split.
15. In conclusion, within the CCP there is yet no sign of any social democratic ideology or that of democracy as opposed to Communism; nor is there any sign of the formation of an international clique as opposed to a nationalist clique. Complicated differences in views, have been many, and these may possibly lead to development of factions.

Possibilities of a Split among CCP Leaders

16. The various views held by CHOU En-lai, CHU Te, LIN Tsu-han, LIU Po-cheng, and TUNG Pi-wu may possibly be milder, from the point of view of the Korean war or as regards to internal military and political policies. However, CHOU En-lai's personal ability is much esteemed by Stalin and he can therefore cause closer relations with Soviet personnel.

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17. The views held by CHEN Shao-yu, CHANG Wen-tien, WANG Chia-hsiang, LI Li-san, and others may be more radical, from the viewpoint of internal policy or from that of foreign policy. Their important backing is their intimate relations with the USSR. However, LI Li-san is not in agreement or on good terms with CHEN Shao-yu, nor with CHANG Wen-tien.
18. MAO Tse-tung, LIU Shao-chi, CHEN Yun, LIN Piao, P'ENG Chen are possibly in between those two groups. They have never had relations with the USSR. However, the prestige and strong personality of MAO Tse-tung has had deciding effects on the formulation of Chinese Communist Party policies.
19. In the past, MAO Tse-tung and CHOU En-lai had some far-reaching controversies, and both LI Li-san and CHEN Shao-yu were once defeated by MAO Tse-tung.

Possible Developments

20. A serious split may develop within the CCP about the degree of the leaning-to-one-side policy, relations with the United States and Great Britain, the question of the Korean war, and the issue of peace and war. Aside from all these, there is yet no sign of any major split on other issues. The growth of a split of this type requires a considerable length of time.
21. The problem of China and that of Asia are involved with a large number of complications that grew up in the past. There are certain differences in opinion among the democratic nations and within the major countries themselves. The American China Policy is, in general, an accurate and cautious one. However, in the eyes of the Asiatics, the democratic countries have not yet had the Asiatics establish a concise and explicit policy to build up a democratic Asia that commands the sympathy of the Asiatics.
22. In connection with the problem of China, one may say that in the implementation and explanation of her policy, the United States seems to have not drawn a rigid line of demarkation between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people, with the aim to make careful and patient attempts to win the sympathy of the Chinese people.
23. To isolate the Chinese Communists, to deliver blows to the Chinese Communists, and at the same time to win the sympathy of the Chinese people, and then to bring about the growth in China of an independent democratic force are no doubt the most important points for democratic forces in the present day situation in China.

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